Within a month of the outbreak of war, the price gap between Brent crude and Russia’s Urals blend widened from USD 4 to more than USD 30 per barrel, PIE noted.
At the start of 2026, the spread stood at around USD 10–11 per barrel. In practice, however, due to weak demand for surplus Russian inventories, crude is being sold at additional discounts of up to USD 20 below Brent quotations.
According to the institute, the pricing pressure has translated into a marked decline in Russian budget revenues. In 2022, proceeds from oil and gas sales accounted for 7.5 percent of Russia’s GDP. By 2025, that share had fallen to 4 percent.
The institute recalled that at the outset of the war the European Union was the largest importer of Russian oil. The bloc has since reduced Russia’s share in its oil imports from 44 percent in 2021 to 7 percent currently, with Slovakia and Hungary accounting for all remaining imports, as both oppose a full phase-out of Russian crude.
In the third quarter of 2025, Russian oil and petroleum products represented 1.5 percent of total EU imports, compared with 26 percent in the first quarter of 2022, PIE said.
Lost EU sales have been partly offset by higher exports to China and India. While the value of exports to China has remained steady at around USD 200 million per day since mid-2022, exports to India have nearly halved in recent months — from USD 100–120 million per day in 2025 to around USD 60–70 million per day in 2026.
PIE said the drop in Indian imports reflects pressure from the United States. Imports of Russian crude by India may decline further under a planned India–US agreement that envisages increased purchases of US oil.
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Source: PAP