In a report entitled "Threats of external interference and information manipulation", the European External Action Service (EEAS) indicates that, of the approximately 43,000 pieces of content related to disinformation that it analysed in 2025, 88% passed through the social network X, owned by US tycoon Elon Musk, far more than the messaging app Telegram (3%) or Facebook (2%).
"The presence of networks of coordinated inauthentic behaviour, the ease of creating fake accounts, but also easier access to data explains this concentration. Most of the major social media platforms restrict access to data that would make it possible to assess the extent of information manipulation," explains the EEAS.
The report states that in most disinformation campaigns, the protagonists tend to try to operate on several platforms at the same time, with different accounts, combining posts on social networks and messages on apps such as WhatsApp or Telegram.
"The aim is to infiltrate the information space to increase the visibility and credibility of the content, while targeting specific audiences based on socio-demographic and geographical factors," he says.
According to the report, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly prevalent in disinformation campaigns against the EU, with an increase of 259 per cent compared to 2024.
"Russian and Chinese actors have fully implemented AI tools to speed up content production and increase meddling activities with fewer resources," reads the report, in line with the analysis of a European official who pointed out that AI is making these operations much cheaper.
Most attacks against politicians
In its analysis of these campaigns, the EEAS found that the majority of attacks (66 per cent) are directed at politicians, with particular emphasis on the presidents of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, and France, Emmanuel Macron, the German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, or the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen.
The EEAS points out that, in most cases, campaigns against these personalities are mainly "attacks on what an individual stands for (such as democratic values or principles)" and an attempt to "instrumentalise the platform they have to reach specific audiences".
In terms of the organisations targeted by these campaigns, political entities are once again in the lead, with 36% of the attacks, followed by the media (23%) and military or security organisations (22%).
"The political and security sectors have been particularly targeted, with the aim of undermining confidence in Defence capabilities. Similarly, the protagonists of these threats identified the media sector as crucial to democracy and therefore directed derogatory narratives, attempts at impersonation and direct smear campaigns at it," the report explains.
Target: election periods
Election periods are the most used contexts for disinformation campaigns, as are popular demonstrations or riots, which are exploited to "fuel perceptions of chaos, fear and disorder, usually against local administrations".
"Moments of high tension and emotional charge are seen by the actors of these threats as vulnerabilities that allow them to reach their target audiences, influence their thinking and amplify existing cognitive prejudices," he says.
The EEAS emphasises that the report should not be "interpreted as exhaustive" in terms of disinformation threats, since it derives from monitoring that does not cover "all regions and languages" and "only represents a small portion of the activities of these actors".
Russia focused disinformation on the EU
Russia has focussed its disinformation and foreign interference campaigns on the European Union in 2025, reducing its attacks on the United States in a "strategic recalibration".
"They have moved from an approach that divided the focus between the European Union (EU) and the United States to a greater emphasis on the EU, while retaining some room for manoeuvre," the report reads.
The EEAS indicates that Russian actors have "focussed on the EU as an adversary, shown an inconsistent approach towards the United States" and sought to portray Moscow as "an alternative to a supposedly morally decadent West".
The report states that Russia remained the main source of disinformation against the EU in 2025: of the 540 incidents analysed by the EEAS in 2025, around 29% were attributed to Russia, followed by China (6%).
"The remaining 65 per cent were not allocated, but had indicators linked to Russian or Chinese infrastructure," reads the EEAS report.
“Russia's main target was Ukraine, followed by Moldova, where parliamentary elections were held in September 2025.”
Through its operations, Moscow seeks to "fuel new or deepen existing divisions" in societies by trying to "mobilise 'anti-system' sentiment and undermine confidence in the EU by portraying it as undemocratic and aggressive or too weak".
The Chinese activities also have their own characteristic: as well as trying to spread conspiracy theories, like the Russians, they also aim to "suppress narratives that go against some of their fundamental interests".
They develop "aggressive measures such as intimidation and harassment of critical voices to suppress information even outside their borders", reads the report, which indicates that China is trying to portray the EU as "subservient to the United States" in terms of foreign policy.
According to EEAS estimates, Russia provides around 1.6 billion euros for this type of operation, while China is estimated to spend between 6 and 8.6 billion euros.
The report also states that, in rare cases, Russia and China work together against the EU, although they usually carry out actions that are classified as "opportunistic", in the sense that they take the opportunity to amplify the attacks unleashed by the other.
One of the examples of these joint operations took place in October 2025, when Russian drones were flying over European space, with China supporting Russia with disinformation campaigns, a European official said.
Source: A European Perspective, RTP
Originally published by c/Lusa on 17 March 2026 09:56 GMT+1