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Six recurring narratives identified in anti-Ukrainian disinformation in Poland

18.11.2026 07:00
A total of 536,000 anti-Ukrainian posts were identified in Poland’s online information space in the first half of 2026, including 387,000 relating to Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera and Ukrainian nationalism as a whole, according to a report by fact-checking organisation Demagog and the Institute of Media Monitoring (IMM), a Warsaw-based technology company.
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The report also identifies six recurring false narratives about Ukrainians, including claims that Russian war crimes in Ukraine were staged, that Kyiv was misappropriating Western aid and that Ukrainian refugees posed a threat to Poles.

Demagog and IMM published their report on Tuesday, examining anti-Ukrainian narratives circulating in Poland’s information space in 2026.

The authors analysed 18 keywords used online as derogatory terms for Ukrainians, including references to “Banderisation,” “Ukrainisation” and the alleged transformation of Poland into a Ukrainian state.

Between January and June, the researchers identified 536,000 publications containing such terms; 72 percent concerned Bandera and related historical references.

The report’s authors said, however, that references to Bandera were mainly used to express criticism of Ukrainian policy.

They linked the increase in such references to President Karol Nawrocki’s June decision to revoke the Order of the White Eagle awarded to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

The decision followed Ukraine’s naming of one of its military training centres after the "Heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA).

The number of publications referring to Bandera increased fourfold between the beginning of the year and mid-June, from around 10,000 to 40,000 a week, the report said.

The authors identified six recurring false narratives used in anti-Ukrainian disinformation.

The first sought to suggest that Ukrainian suffering and Russian war crimes had been staged.

One example was the denial of Russian responsibility for the massacre in Bucha, near Kyiv.

According to the report, the narrative was promoted, among others, by the Russian embassy in Poland.

The authors stressed that international investigations and human rights organisations had confirmed the responsibility of Russian troops for crimes committed in Bucha.

Claims that events in Ukraine had been staged were also used to suggest that Kyiv itself was spreading disinformation.

The report cited a false story about a Ukrainian teenager allegedly hired to pose as the son of fallen soldiers at their funerals. Photographs showing the boy holding pictures of different deceased servicemen were presented as evidence.

In reality, the teenager was not related to any of the soldiers. He attended the funerals voluntarily and helped during religious services, the report said.

The second false narrative claimed that Ukrainians were stealing or selling aid provided by their allies.

Online publications circulated allegations that first-aid kits and medical equipment donated to Ukraine were being sold, alongside claims of weapons trafficking and corruption.

Organisations involved in delivering aid rejected these allegations, pointing out that equipment advertised for sale differed from the supplies actually donated to Ukraine.

The third narrative sought to undermine Zelensky’s credibility and create the impression that public support for him was declining.

As evidence, social media users shared photographs allegedly showing graffiti criticising the Ukrainian president in several European cities, including Warsaw. Demagog said the claims that such graffiti had appeared were false.

The fourth narrative claimed that Ukraine was losing the war and that its government was continuing the conflict against the wishes of its citizens.

False photographs and videos were circulated purporting to show Ukrainians being forcibly sent to the front.

There were also reports of an alleged mobilisation of women in Ukraine, which the country’s Centre for Countering Disinformation denied in late August.

The fifth narrative portrayed Ukraine as seeking to drag Poland into the war and as a threat to other countries.

Incidents involving missiles falling on Polish territory were used to suggest that Ukraine was deliberately provoking its neighbour. One example followed a missile landing near the village of Tarnawa-Kolonia in late July.

According to prosecutors, the missile was a Russian-made Kh-101 cruise missile, manufactured in Russia in the second quarter of 2026. Nevertheless, suggestions circulated online that the incident had been part of a Ukrainian conspiracy.

Disinformation accounts also exploited incidents in which Ukrainian drones crashed in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Online claims suggested that Ukraine had deliberately targeted the Baltic states.

Representatives of the three countries rejected these allegations, confirming that the incidents had not been deliberate Ukrainian attacks but had occurred as a consequence of Russia’s aggression.

A similar false story concerned the alleged killing of soldiers by a Ukrainian national during NATO exercises in Latvia. The claim was attributed to the Euronews media network.

In reality, Euronews had never published such a report, while the Latvian military confirmed that no such incident had taken place.

Demagog said impersonating Western media outlets was a characteristic tactic of the pro-Russian influence operation Storm-1516.

The sixth and final narrative portrayed Ukrainians living in Poland as a threat to Polish citizens.

Social media posts about crime were used to reinforce this message, with old incidents sometimes presented as recent events.

One example concerned an incident on a city bus in Bielsko-Biala, southern Poland, where a man verbally attacked two young Ukrainian women.

False accounts subsequently claimed that the teenagers had provoked the aggressor. However, CCTV footage did not support this version of events.

The report’s authors also pointed out that the crime rate among Ukrainians living in Poland stood at 10 offences per 1,000 people, twice as low as among Polish citizens. Ukrainian nationals were responsible for around 1 percent of crimes committed in Poland, they said.

Another element of the narrative portrayed Ukrainians as a burden on Poland’s public finances and healthcare system.

AI-generated charts allegedly supporting these claims were circulated online. However, a report compiled by Deloitte for the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimated that the presence of Ukrainians contributed 2.4 percent of Poland’s gross domestic product in 2025, equivalent to around PLN 94 billion (EUR 21.5 billion, USD 23.5 billion).

Deloitte’s estimates for 2025 also showed that contributions made by Ukrainian citizens to Poland’s National Health Fund (NFZ) amounted to around PLN 4.4 billion, while healthcare expenditure on them stood at just over PLN 2.5 billion.

The report noted that some of the false claims were consistent with the official Russian narrative, while the dissemination of certain publications was supported by entities linked to Russia.

Some online posts also reproduced content originating from Russian sources or outlets cooperating with the Kremlin.

The authors identified several accounts spreading Russian disinformation in Poland’s online information space. Among those named was former Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller.

(pg/gs)

Source: IAR/PAP