This decade, the world has entered a new phase of turbulence—shaped by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years later, and now, Trump’s return to the White House.
Since being sworn back into office, Trump has embarked on a sweeping overhaul of US foreign policy—an initiative he flagged during his election campaign but one not fully grasped by many international partners.
His actions may appear chaotic, contradictory and at times incoherent. The resulting reputational costs have been significant. Yet beneath the disorder lies a consistent theme: America will no longer allow itself to be economically exploited.
America’s inward turn
After 80 years of deep engagement in global affairs—a period that helped the United States become a global superpower through trade, cultural influence, and above all, the export of trust and security—the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement is demanding a course correction.
This shift reflects the mood of many Americans who believe that domestic challenges such as rising inequality and job losses stem from an excessive focus on foreign entanglements.
At the same time, Russian propaganda has found unprecedented reach on social media, as the Kremlin seeks to amplify America’s inward turn.
One of the clearest priorities of the second Trump administration is improving the US trade balance. Trump has identified the large trade deficit—over USD 140 billion in March alone—as a key concern. His proposed solution: sweeping tariffs on imports. While the diagnosis is valid, the remedy is contentious.
Rapid, unilateral tariff hikes are unlikely to reduce demand for essential raw materials—especially those unavailable or more expensive in the US—nor will they effectively weaken the dollar. A strong dollar continues to make imports cheap and US exports less competitive.
On May 12, Washington and Beijing announced a temporary reduction in tariffs—from the April 2 level of 125 percent down to 10 percent—highlighting that neither side could afford a near-halt in trade.
This climbdown marks a reputational setback for the US, but the broader impact of its global tariff strategy remains uncertain.
If, after the planned 90-day negotiations with both China and the EU, the policy is refined by diplomats—rather than proclaimed on Trump’s Truth Social account—the US could still achieve tangible gains.
US security umbrella
A second pillar of Trump’s approach—particularly relevant to Poland and Ukraine—concerns America’s role as a guarantor of global order.
During his first term, Trump chastised NATO allies for insufficient defence spending. In his second term, he has escalated the rhetoric, warning of the selective fulfillment of alliance commitments.
These warnings now come amid a real military threat from Russia, making them more potent. While the tone may be counterproductive, the underlying message is sound: Europe must take greater responsibility for its own defence.
So far, Europe has largely relied on the US security umbrella at little cost. If all European NATO members spent even half as much on defence as Poland—close to 5 percent of GDP—the continent would be safer, Russia more effectively deterred, and domestic defence industries strengthened.
Peace in Ukraine, reset with Russia?
Finally, consider Trump’s stance on the ongoing war in Ukraine. His recent call for the Ukrainian delegation to attend this week's talks with Russia in Istanbul underscores another recurring theme: halting bloodshed as a prerequisite for negotiating a long-term settlement—even if it comes at Ukraine's expense.
Trump is seeking a reset with Russia and has embraced Putin’s proposal for Turkish-hosted talks, hoping to claim a diplomatic breakthrough by facilitating the first direct Kyiv–Moscow meeting in over three years.
Yet expectations are low. The positions of both sides remain too far apart, and battlefield realities offer little incentive for compromise.
Still, the Istanbul meeting could backfire—on Moscow. Putin’s failure to attend may reinforce Trump’s perception of Russia as an unserious party unwilling to end hostilities.
Tadeusz Iwański
The author is head of the Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova department at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) think tank in Warsaw.