What looked from Europe like a diplomatic embarrassment may instead mark the decisive stage of a US-Russia reset—one that comes at Ukraine’s expense and ushers in a new era of power politics.
The US president is guided by his own interests, which do not include Europe’s concerns about legitimizing Russian leader Vladimir Putin and his war machine, nor any concern for international law or the principle that borders cannot be changed by force.
By deliberately stepping back from the role of global superpower and leader of the liberal world, Washington now regards Moscow as a "nuclear partner"—a player too dangerous to confront directly, given its potential for global destabilization.
Much attention has been paid to the summit's theatrics, the display of US air power and the red-carpet welcome for Putin on American soil—even though the Russian president is wanted by the International Criminal Court for the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.
These symbols matter, but they overshadow far weightier issues: a US-Russia reset, prepared methodically for half a year and now entering its decisive stage; and the fate of Ukraine, still resisting Russia’s onslaught.
Putin’s success is beyond dispute. In a single visit, he killed two birds with one stone: shedding the pariah label in the West’s most important political arena and bringing Trump closer to his narrative about the "roots of the Ukrainian conflict."
Those roots extend well beyond Ukraine, touching the entire post–Cold War security architecture built in Central and Eastern Europe—a region Moscow has always considered its natural sphere of influence.
The result was Trump’s acceptance of the Russian concept of "peace:" not through halting the fighting, which the Kremlin could order with a single command, but by skipping over any ceasefire and jumping straight to a peace treaty—one that would require hundreds of hours of painstaking negotiations.
This gambit allows Moscow to keep the war going and, if Kyiv refuses, to pin the blame on Britain’s MI6 or other "hostile European forces."
According to reports, the Trump-Putin meeting also produced a breakthrough: an agreement on NATO-style security guarantees for Ukraine.
That could suggest Moscow doesn’t want to squander the chance to normalize relations with Washington—the sixth such reset in the last 30 years.
Under that scenario, Russia could bide its time, rebuild its military with lessons learned from the war, and, should Republicans lose in 2028, resume its aggression from a stronger position.
In another version, Russia’s "younger brother" complex is assuaged: Washington is finally treating Moscow "seriously."
The most realistic scenario, however, is that Putin will only accept guarantees for Ukraine on condition that Kyiv replaces its leadership with a regime loyal to Moscow ("demilitarization and denazification")—a prospect that, for now, looks improbable.
For Ukraine, August 18—when President Volodymyr Zelensky visits the White House for the second time—may prove a Rubicon. Trump is likely to lay out "peace terms" that Ukraine cannot accept. If Zelensky refuses, Trump can declare that his "personally crafted" peace initiative was torpedoed by Ukraine.
That would leave Kyiv with a stark choice: continue bleeding on the battlefield, risking internal destabilization and the eventual loss of Donbas a year or two down the road anyway—or change its leadership to one more compliant with Moscow.
Washington, meanwhile, would wash its hands of what Trump will dismiss as "Sleepy Joe’s war," clearing the path for a reset with Russia.
In this arrangement, everyone except Ukraine comes away with something. Trump casts himself as global peacemaker. Putin wins renewed legitimacy and strengthens his hand with the Global South.
Europe is left with the daunting challenge of stepping up as a serious global power.
The Anchorage summit thus signals the end of the post–Cold War order and the dawn of a new era, one in which the strong can openly assert their dominance.
The critical question is whether the hard-won gains of the 30-year liberal era—now drawing to a close—can survive in this new age of power politics. That will be no small challenge.
Leon Pińczak
The author is a security and international affairs analyst at the Polityka Insight think tank in Warsaw.