Even then, the label seemed apt. Today, it is estimated that around 100 members of Kadyrov’s family hold positions of varying rank within Chechnya’s power structures.
In early January, another high-profile appointment fueled fresh speculation about succession.
Kadyrov named his eldest son, Akhmat, acting deputy prime minister of Chechnya. Akhmat turned 20 in November but has already held ministerial posts.
He was named after his grandfather, Akhmad Kadyrov—Ramzan’s father and predecessor—who was killed in a bombing on May 9, 2004.
As in similar cases before, the appointment triggered talk that a transfer of power may be in the making, with the latest appointee seen as a potential heir.
Kadyrov, who used the title of president until 2011 and later became head of the republic, is not yet old—he turns 50 this autumn. Still, rumors about his poor health have circulated for years.
The opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta has reported that he was diagnosed long ago with pancreatic necrosis, while visible swelling has been cited as a possible sign of kidney problems.
Speculation has intensified whenever Kadyrov—normally highly active on social media—has disappeared from public view for weeks at a time. Last summer, he also narrowly avoided drowning while on holiday in Turkey, an incident widely reported by the media.
None of Kadyrov’s many children is yet old enough to formally assume power—but this is an obstacle he knows how to overcome. When he succeeded his father, he himself was below the legally required age of 30 and ruled from behind the scenes for a time.
His marriage initially produced only daughters, who in the North Caucasus have little chance of becoming political leaders. His eldest child, Aishat, now 26, has served as deputy prime minister and culture ministe and enjoys her father's trust—she accompanied him on the ill-fated trip to Turkey.
At most, however, she could one day stand beside one of her brothers as a senior adviser.
Kadyrov’s sons are only now reaching adulthood. For a long time, Adam, who turned 18 just six weeks ago, was seen as the favorite. Despite his age, he already heads Chechnya’s Security Council and began holding senior public posts at 16.
But Kadyrov may have decided that Akhmat’s two-year age advantage works in his favor.
Kadyrov’s position is unlike that of any other regional leader in Russia—in practice, he operates on a federal level. He has eliminated opposition, his security forces operate across Russia and abroad, he maintains his own foreign contacts and has even influenced Kremlin policy.
In 2017, he pressured Russia’s foreign ministry into engaging in the defense of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar. He has also altered Chechnya’s borders, seizing villages in neighboring Ingushetia and Dagestan.
'Putin's foot soldier'
All of this has been possible thanks to the protection of President Vladimir Putin and the steady flow of federal funds.
Kadyrov calls himself "Putin’s foot soldier," yet his relations with Russia’s security agencies have often been fraught. Over time, however, he has become indispensable to Moscow as the guarantor of stability in Chechnya—a role that leaves the central authorities in the uncomfortable position of supplicant.
Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov. Photo: Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
For now, none of Kadyrov’s children enjoys a stature comparable to his or one that would guarantee long-term control. If a succession were to occur, Kadyrov would almost certainly rely on loyal lieutenants such as Prime Minister Magomed Daudov, known as "Lord," and State Duma lawmaker Adam Delimkhanov—seasoned and ruthless figures who have repeatedly proven their loyalty.
But would one of Russia’s powerful security chiefs attempt to install his own man in Grozny? Could rivalry erupt among siblings backed by competing power centers? These questions will remain unanswered until a decisive moment arrives.
One thing can be said with some confidence: as long as Russia’s central authorities do not weaken and federal money continues to flow from Moscow, the likelihood of centrifugal tendencies emerging in the North Caucasus will remain low.
As Dagestani poet Rasul Gamzatov once put it, the region did not join Russia voluntarily—and it will not leave voluntarily either.
Wojciech Górecki
The author is an analyst at the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW).