Chief among the beneficiaries could be Russia and China, especially if the United States makes a strategic miscalculation and Europe fails to prepare for the consequences.
A persistent illusion in international politics is that states act rationally and that war produces clear winners and losers.
History suggests otherwise. Decisions are often shaped by misjudgment, emotion and political pressure—and outcomes can defy even the most confident expectations.
Consider Europe on the eve of World War I. In 1913, it was still possible to imagine a peaceful and prosperous future. Within a few years, the continent had been devastated by industrial-scale warfare, mass death and political collapse.
None of the major powers truly benefited. Germany exhausted itself despite early battlefield success. Empires fell on both sides, including the Russian Empire. France emerged weakened. Only the United States grew stronger, largely because it entered the war late.
That historical pattern—of miscalculation leading to mutual loss—offers a useful lens for viewing today's tensions with Iran.
The United States remains the world’s dominant military power, a fact underscored in the early stages of the conflict. But military superiority has not translated into strategic success: it entered the war without a clear plan and based on flawed assumptions.
The conflict has drifted into a stalemate, exposing the limits of air power against a determined adversary. Iran, for its part, has shown resilience and an ability to absorb pressure while pursuing its own objectives.
An anti-US mural in Tehran, Iran, March 22, 2026. Photo: EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
More troubling is the absence of a clear endgame. Washington has yet to articulate a credible path to securing key objectives such as reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
Escalation—particularly strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure—risks triggering a broader regional collapse. Retaliation could target critical infrastructure across the Gulf, disrupt desalination systems and even contaminate vital waterways.
The global consequences would be severe: energy shocks, economic disruption and large-scale migration. For Europe, that could mean political instability, social unrest and a further rise in extremist movements.
This scenario may sound alarmist. But so did many predictions before 1914.
Domestic political costs in the United States are also likely. A prolonged or unsuccessful conflict could weigh heavily on the governing Republicans, particularly in the mid-term elections.
Yet the greater danger lies in escalation driven not by strategy, but by miscalculation.
Tehran appears to assume that a US ground invasion is too risky to contemplate. That assumption may not hold. Political systems, including democratic ones, are capable of making irrational decisions under pressure.
A limited ground operation—for example, an attempt to seize strategic Iranian territory such as Khark Island—could quickly spiral. A failed operation or heavy losses might force Washington into a broader war to avoid the perception of defeat.
Such a shift would inevitably draw in allies. European governments would face mounting pressure to join the war, even as their own strategic priorities point elsewhere.
At the same time, Washington may seek to neutralize or even engage Russia—a move that carries its own risks.
For Moscow, the calculus is straightforward. Iran is not an ally but an instrument. Escalation serves Russian interests by draining US resources and attention. Whether Iran emerges weakened or intact is secondary. What matters is that Washington becomes more deeply entangled.
Russia is already reaping indirect benefits, from higher energy prices to easing geopolitical pressure. A wider war would also strain transatlantic relations, particularly if European states resist deeper involvement.
That tension is itself a strategic gain for the Kremlin.
The broader risk is that a distracted and divided West creates an opening for further instability elsewhere.
If the United States becomes bogged down in the Middle East and NATO cohesion weakens, the deterrence balance in Europe could shift.
The Baltic states, long seen as a potential flashpoint, would become more exposed unless Europe moves quickly to strengthen its defenses.
For Europe, that means resisting pressure to become militarily entangled in the Middle East and focusing instead on credible deterrence closer to home—ensuring that Russia does not seize even a single square inch of EU territory.
Witold Repetowicz
Witold Repetowicz. Photo: PR24/AK
The author is a journalist and Middle East expert who has reported from Syria and Iraq and written books on conflicts in the region. He lectures at the War Studies University in Warsaw.