Speaking in Wrocław, southwestern Poland, on Wednesday at the "East x West Forum" business and strategy conference, Sikorski said future historians may point to February 28, 2026, the start of the American-Israeli air campaign against Iran, as a decisive date.
He argued that the war in the Middle East is not the cause of today’s instability, but a sign of a much deeper crisis in the international system.
In his view, the current upheaval is the most serious shift since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
“At this stage, it is impossible to say how long this confrontation will last or whether it will remain limited to the current region,” Sikorski said.
He said the conflict had exposed problems that until recently were discussed mainly behind closed doors or in specialist publications.
Crisis of trust
He pointed to a crisis of trust between the United States and its allies, serious limits on the ability of even the strongest military powers to shape events, and the deep dependence of modern economies on stable supplies of energy and critical raw materials.
Sikorski said several powerful forces are driving the wider crisis. The first, he argued, is geopolitics, with the balance of power that seemed stable for decades no longer matching reality, while global institutions are failing to keep pace with rapid change.
He questioned whether institutions built after World War II can still function effectively in an era shaped by artificial intelligence and humanoid robots.
He warned that many rising powers do not feel they benefit from the existing order, while countries that once dominated it have fewer resources to sustain it.
The second force, he said, is the speed of technological change, especially in artificial intelligence and computing power.
Sikorski said the world is facing a qualitative shift, not just another wave of innovation. He pointed to hopes for breakthroughs in medicine and energy systems, but also to growing rivalry over semiconductors, data and energy, which he said is becoming a major source of tension between states.
He also warned of social costs tied to automation, labor market disruption, and the concentration of wealth and knowledge in the hands of a small number of companies and individuals.
The third factor, he said, is social frustration. Using the United States as an example, Sikorski argued that macroeconomic strength does not automatically translate into a better life for ordinary citizens.
He said many Americans hear that they live in the world’s richest and most powerful country, but do not feel the benefits in their daily lives.
That gap, he said, fuels political frustration and a desire in many countries to tear up the foundations of the existing order.
He added that the use of force, once seen as a failure of diplomacy, is increasingly treated as a way to weaken an opponent before negotiations.
Dangers for Poland
Sikorski said this trend is dangerous for countries such as Poland.
Over the past 35 years, he said, Poland has benefited greatly from a rules-based international system and has risen from the European periphery to become one of the European Union’s larger players.
But, he added, Poland remains a medium-sized country with limited ability to shape the outside world on its own.
That is why, he said, countries like Poland need predictability, legal stability and institutions that constrain the arbitrary actions of stronger powers. He named the European Union and NATO as examples.
He warned against arguments that Poland or other countries would fare better alone.
In one of the sharpest lines of his speech, he said such thinking made about as much sense as jumping from a powerful aircraft carrier onto a boat in the middle of a storm.
'NATO 3.0'
In a discussion after the speech, Sikorski was also asked about US President Donald Trump’s style of diplomacy and the possibility of the United States leaving NATO. He said Trump should be taken “not literally, but seriously.”
Sikorski said he was concerned when Trump referred to NATO allies as “they,” because it suggested a mental distancing from the alliance.
At the same time, he argued that Europe should assume most of the cost of conventional defense, while the United States would continue to provide nuclear deterrence and a few key strategic capabilities.
He described that possible arrangement as "NATO 3.0."
(rt/gs)