Politico reported, citing two sources familiar with the matter, that Ratcliffe warned Russian officials this week against attacking NATO members, particularly Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a Washington think tank, said in a recent report that the urgency of the trip pointed to a real and pressing danger.
Still, ISW analysts found no buildup resembling the one that preceded Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. "We have not observed any evidence of a large-scale concentration [of troops] in the area along Russia's border with the Baltic states", the institute said, adding that Estonian and Latvian officials likewise report no change in their threat assessments.
That doesn't rule out a smaller strike. ISW analysts said Russia "could carry out strikes on targets in the Baltic states or a limited ground invasion using small forces" that would not require the visible troop buildup seen in 2021.
A years-long campaign of sabotage
The warning comes after years of Russian hybrid activity across the region. The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) documented 151 Russian-directed sabotage acts across the European Union since 2022, including 15 in Lithuania, 11 in Estonia and five in Latvia — part of a broader campaign that has hit critical infrastructure, maritime and air borders, and satellite navigation.
PISM counted nine sabotage incidents targeting undersea energy and communications cables in the Baltic Sea since 2022, several linked to Russia's "shadow fleet" and Chinese vessels. One such attack, on a power cable between Estonia and Finland in December 2024, prompted NATO to launch its Baltic Sentry mission to guard the region's undersea infrastructure.
Russian interference has also disrupted satellite navigation on a massive scale: gpsjam.org data cited in the PISM report recorded more than 1,000 GNSS disruptions each in Latvia and Estonia, and nearly 1,000 in Lithuania, between March 2022 and March 2026. Airspace violations have added to the tension, including a swarm of smuggling balloons over Lithuania in 2025, a Russian Shahed drone that crashed in Latvia in 2024, and a more than 10-minute incursion by three armed MiG-31 fighter jets over Estonia last year.
On the ground, Russia has recruited people online to carry out vandalism and violence, including a 2024 arson attack on an IKEA store in Vilnius and a foiled attack on an IKEA in Riga. Russian-linked violence has also targeted individuals, including the 2024 beating in Lithuania of Russian opposition figure Leonid Volkov, a former close associate of Alexei Navalny.
Baltic states reinforce their borders
The three countries have moved to fortify their frontiers with Russia and Belarus. Estonia expects to finish 90% of planned defenses along its roughly 340-kilometer border with Russia by year's end. Latvia has fenced more than 280 kilometers of its border with Russia and 160 kilometers with Belarus. Lithuania, which borders Russia's Kaliningrad exclave rather than Russia proper, has installed a monitoring system along its more than 270-kilometer stretch.
Given their small populations and limited budgets, the Baltic states rely heavily on NATO for air and missile defense, lacking combat aircraft or long-range systems of their own. Their defense industries focus on drones, robotics and cybersecurity, while heavier equipment is imported — Lithuania is a partial exception, having bought 44 Leopard 2 tanks in 2024 with plans to assemble them domestically by 2028-2030.
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, with a combined population of about 6 million, joined the EU and NATO together in 2004 after regaining independence in 1991, decades after Soviet annexation during World War II.
(jh)
Source: PAP