An Iran open to cooperation with the West could be prosperous: it has oil, gas and human capital. Instead, its turn toward Russia and China has brought it little more than another illusion.
The Iranian-Chinese agreement signed in March 2021 was supposed to deliver USD 400 billion in investment over 25 years. In reality, it has mainly meant China buying Iranian oil at a discount and Iran’s market being flooded with cheap goods that squeeze out local entrepreneurs.
From the outset, Russia has been the main beneficiary of Iran’s isolation and sanctions, despite claiming otherwise.
Iran could be a competitor to Russia in energy markets. It is not—sanctions have choked it from the outside, while decaying infrastructure strangles it from within.
A country with some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves barely registers as an exporter, and there is now even talk of a risk to Iran’s energy self-sufficiency.
It is no surprise that Iranians are protesting. The latest wave, which began in late December, is the result of deepening impoverishment.
Sanctions have played a role, and parts of the elite understand that without reaching an accommodation with the West, conditions will only worsen.
The current system still has its supporters—within the state apparatus and among those who benefit from it. But anyone who believes the Islamic Republic is on the verge of collapse, that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will flee to Moscow, and that the son of the last shah, Reza Pahlavi, will return to usher in democracy is confusing wishful thinking with analysis.
Protests have erupted in Iran every few years since 1999, when students first took to the streets. The largest waves came in 2009 and 2022.
In 2009, they were led by Mir Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister, and backed by parts of the clergy; the state responded with repression. In 2022, the spark was the death of Mahsa Amini after her arrest by the morality police.
But the scale of the protests reflected broader exhaustion—with both the social restrictions inherited from the 1979 revolution and the country’s economic collapse. The Islamic Republic survived through repression, but some elites concluded that Iran needed to open itself to investment and ease police control over daily life.
Official policy, however, continued to point to Russia and China as Iran’s "greatest friends," while hard-liners indulged in visions of an anti-Western alliance.
Yet Iranians have never felt much affection for Russia, and the deal with China was controversial from the start, even among people close to power.
Iran fared worst by supplying Russia with drones used against Ukraine. In return, Tehran hoped for S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 fighter jets but received little.
Moscow played its own game: in Syria it tolerated Israeli airstrikes on Iranian positions and felt no obligation to reciprocate Iran’s support.
Over time, more members of Iran’s ruling elite have come to see that relying on such an "alliance" was a mistake.
But reaching an understanding with the West also faces resistance from the other side. Israel has consistently sought to block any deal, urging Washington to believe the regime is about to collapse.
The alternatives it promotes can be farcical: Reza Pahlavi as a democratic savior, or Maryam Rajavi and her People’s Mujahedin, who until recently were designated a terrorist organization in the United States. Add to that support for separatists and circulating maps of Iran’s "partition," and most Iranians are repelled. Neither Pahlavi nor Rajavi has real support inside the country.
The reality is that Israel prefers chaos in Iran to an agreement between Tehran and the West that would end Iran’s self-destructive, pro-China and pro-Russia course.
For Russia, any escalation involving Iran is beneficial: it keeps Iran isolated, excludes it from energy markets and drags the United States deeper into the Middle East.
It would be better if both Iran and the West finally recognized this—and reached a deal.
Witold Repetowicz
Witold Repetowicz. Photo: PR24/AK
The author is an assistant professor at the War Studies University in Warsaw.
Click on the audio player above to hear a report by Michał Owczarek.