When Nikol Pashinyan, already known for his pro-Western views, came to power in Armenia eight years ago in a peaceful revolution, some argued it had been tacitly agreed with Moscow. That narrative persists.
In its current form, it holds that Armenia’s apparent pivot to the West is, at best, an attempt to diversify Yerevan’s foreign policy, and at worst a smokescreen concealing the prime minister's real aim: staying in power while preserving the status quo with Russia.
As evidence, critics note that Pashinyan has not—at least publicly—considered expelling the Russian military base in Gyumri in the north of the country.
But why would he, others counter, if doing so risked provoking even greater Kremlin anger without firm guarantees from other global players?
There is much to suggest that this narrative is encouraged by Moscow itself, surprised by the independence shown by its formal ally.
Armenia's pro-Western Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Photo: Primeminister.kz, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
Armenia remains, de jure, a member of Russian-led post-Soviet structures, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but in practice has stepped back from participation and funding.
The argument appears aimed at persuading Western partners that Pashinyan is not worth backing—that he remains, ultimately, "Moscow’s man"—and at discouraging pro-European Armenian voters from supporting his Civil Contract party.
Yet actions tell a different story.
Pashinyan has for years pursued a pro-European course with notable consistency. Its contours became clear after Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, and especially after Azerbaijan’s escalation in September 2022, when attacks on Armenian territory drew no response from either Russia or the CSTO despite formal alliance commitments.
A series of milestones underscores this shift.
On April 5, 2024, a summit in Brussels between Armenia, the EU and the United States pledged support for reforms and economic development, including financial assistance.
On March 26, 2025, Armenia’s parliament passed a law launching the process of EU accession.
On December 10, 2025, a new EU-Armenia partnership agenda was adopted, following a strategic partnership agreement with the United States signed earlier that year.
For anyone still in doubt, recent summits should make clear that Armenia's Western turn is serious.
Moscow's reaction has been sharp. Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov accused Yerevan of trying to "sit on two chairs," warning it was damaging bilateral relations.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Armenia's course would "sooner or later lead to its irreversible involvement in Brussels' anti-Russian line," with political and economic consequences.
Armenia's ambassador was also summoned to the Russian foreign ministry following remarks by Zelensky in Yerevan that were critical of Russia.
Whether Pashinyan's pro-Western pivot succeeds will become clearer in the short term after parliamentary elections on June 7, when Armenians will either back his party or vote against it.
The strategic outcome, however, may take years—or even decades—to determine.