Israel appears to have oversold to US President Donald Trump the prospect of easily crippling the Islamic Republic, triggering a popular uprising and perhaps even bringing about regime change.
Events have unfolded rather differently. While it is still too early to assess the final balance sheet of gains and losses before the terms of the agreement are made public, the conflict has clearly created far more problems for the US president than he expected.
For Russia, by contrast, the conflict was a strategic gift. Moscow has long benefited from instability in the Middle East, and for the moment the danger of a wider regional conflagration appears to have receded. If so, the Kremlin will be left disappointed.
Escalating conflicts in the region have traditionally worked to Russia's advantage by creating problems for both Europe and the United States.
Wars and instability generate migration pressures, something Moscow has become adept at exploiting through hybrid warfare and the weaponization of migration.
Poland has experienced this firsthand on its border with Belarus, while much of Europe has grappled with the issue since the 2015 migration crisis.
Middle Eastern instability also increases the risk of terrorism. Combined with Russian disinformation campaigns, this has often contributed to political polarization across Europe and boosted support for far-right and far-left movements, some of which maintain ties to Moscow.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, has spilled onto the streets of European cities, especially after Israeli military operations in Gaza and Lebanon resulted in widespread destruction and significant civilian casualties, including women, children, journalists and humanitarian workers.
Russian propaganda throughout the Global South—and especially in the Muslim world—has sought to place responsibility on the "collective West," a category into which Poland is routinely placed.
The war with Iran, into which Israel drew the United States, was in many ways a dream scenario for the Putin regime. Oil prices surged, and Washington temporarily eased restrictions on Russian energy exports in an effort to stabilize global markets.
At the same time, tensions began to emerge within the transatlantic alliance as European NATO members resisted US pressure to join military action against Iran.
Moscow, however, was hoping for even more.
It was no secret that during the 12-day Iran-Israel war in 2025, Russian strategists hoped the conflict would eventually draw in US ground forces.
It is also worth remembering that Russia maintains considerable influence in Israel.
The current head of Mossad, for example, was born in Belarus. During the Syrian conflict, the Kremlin reportedly assisted Israel in identifying Iranian targets, something Iranian officials themselves occasionally acknowledged in private conversations.
It is therefore hardly surprising that both Russia and Israel favored escalation, albeit for entirely different reasons.
Not the 'next Vietnam'
Even many Iranians understood that Moscow's public declarations of support concealed a desire to use Iran as bait to draw the United States into a "Middle Eastern Vietnam."
Had that happened, Russia would almost certainly have used the opportunity to test NATO's eastern flank through hybrid operations, potentially targeting one of the Baltic states with provocations.
Iran, of course, made a major mistake by supplying Shahed drones to Russia and becoming involved in Moscow's war against Ukraine. In return, it received very little from the Kremlin.
From Tehran's perspective, however, the calculation looked different.
The collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the previous nuclear agreement, left many Iranian policymakers convinced that the West had abandoned them, narrowing their strategic options.
Hardliners within the Iranian leadership also tended to assume that if the United States was Iran's enemy, then Russia must naturally be its ally.
What this logic overlooked was the depth and complexity of Russian-Israeli relations.
A preliminary agreement is expected to be signed on Friday, though the road toward a final settlement remains long and likely difficult. Russia's interest lies in seeing the negotiations collapse somewhere along the way.
If a comprehensive agreement is eventually reached, however, Russian influence in Iran is likely to diminish rapidly while the costs to Moscow increase.
The lifting of sanctions and the reintegration of Iranian oil and gas into global markets would reshape international energy trade and provide Europe with a new source of diversification. Iran will remain primarily focused on China, but recent conversations with Iranian diplomats suggest that Tehran is also interested in expanding economic ties with Europe.
For Poland, this could mean revisiting investment plans once pursued by the energy companies PGNiG and Orlen following the original JCPOA agreement.
A final observation.
One of my students recently wrote an excellent thesis examining how US-Vietnamese relations evolved from a devastating war into a pragmatic partnership based on shared interests. I believe a similar transformation is possible between the United States and Iran.
And it may happen much faster than many expect, because, fortunately, the world appears to have avoided an "Iranian Vietnam."
Witold Repetowicz
Witold Repetowicz. Photo: PR24/AK
The author is a journalist and Middle East expert who has reported from Syria and Iraq and written books on conflicts in the region. He lectures at the War Studies University in Warsaw.