Jerzy Giedroyc: The Polish intellectual who thought in terms of the state [COMMENTARY]

Jerzy Giedroyc, one of the most influential figures of the Polish émigré community after World War II, is among the cultural and political figures Poland is commemorating this year.

Jerzy Giedroyc

PAP/Jerzy Ruciński

A writer, editor, intellectual and political activist, he gathered around the Paris-based journal Kultura an intellectual milieu that shaped how generations of Poles viewed their state, as well as Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus.

Born on July 27, 1906, in Minsk—now the capital of Belarus—Giedroyc worked before World War II as a civil servant, journalist and editor of the magazines Bunt Młodych and Polityka.

During the war, he joined the trail of Gen. Władysław Anders and the 2nd Polish Corps. After the war, he chose not to return to communist-controlled Poland.

In 1946, he co-founded the Polish Literary Institute, first in Rome and, from 1947, in France. There he launched Kultura, which would become one of the most important Polish-language periodicals of the 20th century.

Kultura was far more than an émigré magazine. It became a centre of independent political and cultural thought, operating beyond communist censorship and outside the constraints of day-to-day party politics.

Writers and intellectuals such as Czesław Miłosz, Witold Gombrowicz, Józef Czapski and Juliusz Mieroszewski published there.

Giedroyc had a remarkable ability to bring together people with very different views while demanding seriousness and responsibility in public debate. His focus was always on Poland’s future: sovereign, modern, rooted in the West and fully aware of its position between Germany and Russia.

The most important part of his political legacy became known as the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine, often referred to as the ULB concept—named after Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus.

Its core idea was simple, though politically difficult for many Poles at the time: Poland should accept its postwar borders, abandon dreams of reclaiming cities such as Vilnius and Lviv, and instead build lasting partnerships with independent eastern neighbours.

Giedroyc believed that a free Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus were not only a moral imperative, but also a condition for Poland’s own independence and security.

It was an exceptionally farsighted vision. At a time when Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus were still part of the Soviet Union, Giedroyc and his collaborators wrote as though their future independence were a realistic political objective.

Their thinking was not driven simply by hostility toward Russia. Rather, it rejected imperial thinking altogether—both Russian and Polish.

In Giedroyc’s view, Poland needed to stop seeing the East as lost territory of a former empire and instead recognise the nations there as sovereign peoples with their own language, history and political aspirations.

The importance of this idea became especially clear after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ukrainian independence is no longer an abstract historical principle from the Polish perspective. It has become one of the foundations of Polish security.

Jerzy Giedroyc był jedną z najważniejszych postaci polskiej emigracji politycznej. „Kultura” nie była zwykłym pismem emigracyjnym. Była ośrodkiem niezależnego myślenia o Polsce, działającym poza cenzurą PRL. @kultura_gov_pl @PLInst_Paris @dziejepl https://t.co/R6gO9WcOWm

— Redakcja Polska Polskiego Radia dla Zagranicy (@RadioZagranica) May 25, 2026

As Ukraine defends its sovereignty, it weakens Russian imperial power and pushes the line of danger farther from Poland’s borders. Had Ukraine fallen under Moscow's control, Poland would face a far more precarious strategic position.

The same logic applies to Belarus. Today’s Belarus is not a free partner of Poland, but a state closely tied to Russia and increasingly integrated into Moscow’s military strategy.

Yet this only reinforces the importance of Giedroyc’s thinking: Poland’s interest lies not in dominating Minsk, Kyiv or Vilnius, but in ensuring those capitals can determine their own futures independently.

Giedroyc also advocated a difficult but pragmatic approach to historical memory. He understood that Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Lithuanian relations were burdened by historical grievances and disputes.

He did not argue for forgetting history. Instead, he believed there should be a hierarchy of priorities: first security, independence and regional cooperation, then the gradual resolution of historical disputes.

Contemporary Polish foreign policy owes much to Giedroyc, even when politicians do not invoke his name directly. His ideas became one of the foundations of Poland’s eastern policy after 1989: recognition of borders, support for the independence of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus, and efforts to draw those countries closer to the West.

After 2022, this ceased to be merely an intellectual tradition associated with émigré journalism. It became a matter of strategic necessity.

That is why Giedroyc remains so relevant today. He did not leave behind a ready-made political manual. What he offered instead was a way of thinking: sober, state-minded, free from sentimental nostalgia and clear-eyed about the dangers of Russian imperialism.

At a time when war has once again reshaped Europe’s political landscape, his ideas appear less like historical theory and more like enduring strategic realism.

Giedroyc died on September 14, 2000, in Maisons-Laffitte near Paris.

Sławomir Sieradzki