Ukraine’s heating season officially began on Thursday, and much like in previous years, it started under Russian fire.
As local authorities and utility companies reported fresh damage to energy infrastructure from missile and drone strikes, Ukrainians were preparing for what could be the hardest winter since the war began.
In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up attacks on Ukraine’s energy grid.
The tactic is familiar: in past winters, Moscow unleashed waves of strikes on power plants, heating facilities, transformer stations and high-voltage lines to disrupt daily life, break civilian morale and sow public discontent.
  A damaged power line near Kherson, southern Ukraine, Nov. 26, 2022. Photo: EPA/ROMAN PILIPEY
    A damaged power line near Kherson, southern Ukraine, Nov. 26, 2022. Photo: EPA/ROMAN PILIPEY 
 
This year, however, the campaign has taken on new features.
A shift in Russia’s strategy
Russia has changed its approach, using more drones and missiles than in previous years and concentrating strikes on specific regional targets.
The goal appears to be to exhaust Ukraine’s air defenses and maximize localized damage, leading to temporary blackouts—such as those recently reported in Kharkiv.
Moscow is also targeting gas infrastructure more systematically.
In past winters, compressor stations and extraction sites were rarely hit. Now, the attacks seem designed to cripple production in the Poltava region—home to much of Ukraine’s gas industry—as well as in the west, and to knock out poorly protected gas treatment facilities.
The Bloomberg news agency reported this month that Ukraine may have lost as much as 60 percent of its gas production capacity.
Kyiv better prepared
Despite the challenges, Kyiv has learned from previous years and is better prepared for winter than before—with larger strategic fuel reserves and stronger protection for key infrastructure.
In September, the energy ministry said installed generation capacity exceeds 17 gigawatts, likely enough to meet demand. Ukraine even exported surplus electricity to neighboring countries this fall — a sign that damage may have been less severe than expected or that repair and recovery efforts were faster and broader than anticipated.
Evidence also suggests that Russia’s repeated strikes on the same facilities—such as the Kremenchuk refinery and the TEC-5 power plant near Kharkiv— may indicate those sites have been partially restored.
Gas supplies and foreign aid
The main challenge now lies in financing gas imports, estimated at about USD 2 billion for 4 to 6 billion cubic meters of fuel.
Ukraine lacks that funding, but aid from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank and Norway’s government has already started flowing.
Ukraine’s gas transmission links with Poland and Slovakia remain open, and its underground storage facilities in the west have space to spare.
Electricity and gas imports from the European Union are not currently at risk, even though relations with key partners such as Hungary and Slovakia are strained. Despite harsh rhetoric and occasional threats, both countries profit from energy transit and emergency power sales to Ukraine.
Still, the coming months could prove decisive. If Russia maintains its intense bombardment of Ukraine’s power and gas networks—and if winter temperatures drop sharply—this could become Ukraine’s most difficult winter since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022.
Tadeusz Iwański
  Tadeusz Iwański
    Tadeusz Iwański     
 
The author is head of the Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova department at the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). From 2006 to 2011, he worked at Polskie Radio dla Zagranicy, the Polish public broadcaster's international service.