For the first time since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, several dozen Indian soldiers joined the drills, though they trained with Russian forces east of Moscow rather than on Belarusian soil.
Russian troops taking part in the Zapad-2025 drills earlier this month. Photo: EPA/RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY PRESS SERVICE HANDOUT
Defense or aggression?
This year’s exercises were preceded by a major Russian provocation against Poland: the incursion of some 20 drones into Polish airspace.
The incident heightened NATO’s sense of threat from maneuvers near its border, though most analysts stressed there was no immediate danger of an invasion, given the organizers’ declared troop numbers—around 30,000.
Still, NATO experts warned Russia’s track record of hybrid tactics made it impossible to rule out escalation.
German daily Bild reported, citing military sources, that Russian and Belarusian forces tested operations aimed at seizing the Suwałki Gap, a strategic stretch of land near Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave.
“Even the relatively small number of troops involved in Belarus—just 18,200, including 5,500 Russians—should not obscure the dangerous nature of these drills,” analyst Julian Röpcke wrote in Bild. “Putin and Lukashenko are rehearsing three new strategies for a joint war with the West.”
The centerpiece of the drills was a simulated use of nuclear weapons, in particular the new medium-range Oreshnik missiles aimed at the West. Analysts said this element was purely psychological, intended to intimidate countries bordering Belarus.
An equally important scenario involved what was officially described as a “defensive battle, defeating an enemy that has broken through the lines, and restoring the territorial integrity of the state.”
According to Russian propaganda, this “defensive operation” took place in the Kaliningrad region and surrounding areas—that is, on Belarusian territory and in the Baltic zone adjacent to the Russian exclave.
To “defend” Kaliningrad, however, Russian forces would have to advance from Belarus through the Suwałki Gap—a land bridge barely 60 kilometers wide between Belarus and Russia, but belonging to Poland and Lithuania. In other words, while Moscow claimed it was rehearsing the defense of Kaliningrad, in reality the scenario amounted to preparing an attack on two NATO countries.
Finally, the third phase of the exercises focused on countering “enemy agents and saboteurs.” According to Röpcke, this was in fact training to suppress regime opponents in Russia and Belarus, as well as rehearsing sabotage operations against NATO member states.
A blueprint for provocation
Pavel Latushka, deputy head of Belarus’ opposition-in-exile, disclosed that several years ago Belarusian and Russian general staffs had discussed staging a border provocation with Poland or Lithuania. One scenario envisioned arming illegal migrants, who would fire at Belarusian guards after crossing into Poland, prompting retaliatory fire into Polish territory. Even artillery exchanges were considered, he said.
Analysts noted Russia has long relied on fabricated casus belli—false pretexts for war—such as its 2022 claim of “genocide” against Russian speakers in Ukraine.
Latushka warned that Putin’s ultimate aim is to demoralize European societies into abandoning Ukraine and pressuring their governments to disengage.
A Russian battle tank...
...and armored vehicles in training. Photo: EPA/RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY PRESS SERVICE HANDOUT
Patterns and risks
Observers recalled that Zapad-2021 ended without incident, but only months later Moscow launched “Allied Resolve-2022,” which culminated in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, using Belarus as a staging ground.
Meanwhile, the Russian threat has gone far beyond exercises. In 2023, authorities in various countries recorded 55 incidents of GPS jamming and spoofing believed to be caused by Russia. In the first half of 2025 alone, there were 730 such disruptions, most of them in the Baltic Sea region.
A Russian warship. Photos: EPA/RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY PRESS SERVICE HANDOUT
Two scenarios ahead
Ukrainian political analyst Oleh Lisnyi outlined two possible post-Zapad trajectories: a long-term disinformation and drone-incursion campaign to keep Europe on edge while diverting attention from other possible attack vectors; or, if Putin judges Poland sufficiently weak, a direct strike against it as Russia’s next target after Ukraine.
Whether the second scenario is realistic or not, analysts agree on one certainty: as long as Vladimir Putin remains in power, neither Europe nor the wider world can count on lasting peace.
A Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter. Photo: EPA/RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY PRESS SERVICE HANDOUT
Jan Krzysztof Michalak in Belarus