Optimists believe that after the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the power structure of the Islamic Republic will collapse and Reza Pahlavi—who has been promoted for months as the figurehead of the opposition—will take power and usher in democracy.
For now, however, there is little evidence to support that outcome.
The United States has focused on military preparations while neglecting the need for a detailed transition plan and for building a broad opposition front capable of stabilizing the country in the event of the Islamic Republic’s fall.
By contrast, ahead of the widely criticized 2003 invasion of Iraq (also criticized by Trump), the Bush administration organized meetings among various opposition groups, including Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis.
For a variety of reasons, that did not ensure a smooth transformation—but at least there was a plan. In this case, there is none.
Iran is no Venezuela
If Trump assumed that Iran would follow a Venezuelan-style scenario—cut off the head and the rest will submit—he miscalculated.
Iran is not Venezuela. There are signs Khamenei anticipated the possibility of becoming a "martyr" and prepared the system accordingly.
Moreover, Israel, the United States’ main partner in this war, has through controlled leaks (or outright disinformation) weakened the chances that the old guard of pragmatists—figures such as Rouhani, Zarif or Khatami—could take power and reopen negotiations.
The Islamic Republic is not run by irrational fanatics, but neither is it led by corrupt opportunists.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will defend the system to the bitter end, and Khamenei’s death would likely serve as further motivation for their own "martyrdom," a concept deeply rooted in Shiite tradition.
That may well have been the Supreme Leader’s plan.
It is also risky to assume that massive air strikes—likely to inflict heavy losses on Iran—would trigger a revolution capable of toppling the regime.
Yet that appears to be the only option left for the United States to claim a convincing victory.
The alternative is negotiations—but not on the terms Trump seems to envision. If the Islamic Republic survives, even badly battered, it will have won the war.
That would deal a major global reputational blow to both Trump and the United States, one that Russia and China would exploit.
At the same time, it is doubtful the authorities in Tehran can be overthrown without deploying ground forces, and no country in the region is eager to take part in such an operation.
Democracy and stability?
It is also worth recalling that the new US strategy no longer prioritizes the promotion of democracy in foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East.
Beyond most Iranians themselves, few in the region are interested in a free, democratic and stable Iran.
A democratic success story would pose a major threat to the autocratic monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, and it would not guarantee Israel a government in Tehran that pursued a consistently friendly policy.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not naïve; his goal is simply to weaken and destabilize the Islamic Republic.
An authoritarian regime led by Reza Pahlavi, meanwhile, would likely have to rely on sustained external support to survive.
There was little doubt that Iran would respond to the attack with massive strikes against US targets in the region, as well as against Saudi Arabia, which—despite official statements—favored war.
At the same time, it is questionable whether any Arab state would carry out a meaningful military response against Iran. None wants to expose itself further, especially without certainty that the Islamic Republic will fall.
Escalation and chaos would play into Russia's hands
For Russia, the current situation has both advantages and disadvantages—but more of the former.
The collapse of the Islamic Republic would be a setback for Moscow, but that outcome appears distant.
Russia no longer needs Iranian drones, as it now produces its own versions based on the Shahed design. Its failure to deliver Su-24 aircraft and S-400 air defense systems, which Iran had hoped for, suggests that Moscow’s main interest lies in escalation and chaos—drawing Washington into a quagmire in the Middle East.
Russia may also try to persuade Trump to strike some kind of deal in exchange for "withdrawing" support for Iran. The United States should be wary of such overtures, as Russia appears unwilling to provide Iran with meaningful military assistance in any case.
Witold Repetowicz
Witold Repetowicz. Photo: PR24/AK
The author is an assistant professor at the War Studies University in Warsaw.