Aleksandra Wójtowicz, a PISM researcher, told Polish Press Agency (PAP) that two fresh reports by watchdog Alliance4Europe showed how sanctioned Belarusian state broadcaster Radio Belarus and Russia’s long-running “Operation Doppelganger” combined covertly to shape online debate ahead of the 18 May first-round vote.
Belarusian channels evade EU bans
The study found that Polish-language accounts linked to Radio Belarus remained active on TikTok, YouTube, X and Facebook despite EU sanctions, generating “millions of views” by reposting short videos that questioned the legitimacy of Poland’s electoral institutions and amplified fringe candidates.
“These accounts disappeared and re-appeared under new names each time a platform took them down. It was a deliberate, labor-intensive strategy to reach ever-wider audiences,” Wójtowicz said, adding that comments were bulk-posted to create an illusion of mass support.
‘Doppelganger’ bots flood X with anti-EU posts
A second report traced at least 321 Polish-language tweets from the Kremlin-backed Doppelganger network between April 11 and May 21
Botnets altered a single letter in media outlet names or hijacked verified articles, sandwiching them between false claims that Ukrainians were “Nazis” and that EU aid was bankrupting Poland. The posts were viewed an estimated 1.2 million times and retweeted over 271,000 times.
Both operations, the report said, framed Russia as the sole guarantor of “peace and prosperity” and portrayed any alternative end to the war in Ukraine as unrealistic or dangerous.
Activity continues after vote
The influence campaigns did not stop on polling day; anti-EU and pro-Russian posts persisted for at least 48 hours, raising fears they could be used to question president-elect Karol Nawrocki’s narrow victory. PISM is preparing follow-up studies to assess the long-term threat, Wójtowicz said.
Watchdogs flag systemic weaknesses
An election-monitoring mission from the OSCE and the Council of Europe last month warned that opaque online-campaign financing and poor inter-agency coordination hampered Poland’s ability to counter disinformation.
“Responses were fragmented; one institution often didn’t know what the other was doing,” Wójtowicz noted. “We need a joint plan and a rapid information-sharing mechanism.”
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Source: PAP, Alliance4Europe, OSCE